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Abstract
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus prolifera-
tion in a vertically di¤erentiated oligopoly under the assumption that
some rms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and
their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct rm. We analyse
whether pruning emerges and, if so, a ghting brand is marketed. We
nd that it is always more protable for colluding rms to adopt a
pricing strategy such that some variants are withdrawn from the mar-
ket. Under pruning, these rms commercialize a ghting brand only
when facing competitors in a low-end market.
Keywords: Vertically Di¤erentiated Markets, Cannibalization, Mar-
ket Pruning, Price Collusion.
JEL Classication: D42, D43, L1, L12, L13, L41.
1 Introduction
What happens to the product lines of oligopolistic rms when they decide
to collude in prices? Combining about prices should also be the occasion to
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combine about product line policies: it provides the opportunity to revisit
the existing competition among products sold by the ex-ante competitors.
In particular, colluding rms can possibly prune some existing products ap-
pearing in their product lines. When rms decide to proliferate the number
of their products, it reinforces competition, while pruning reduces their num-
ber and thereby reduces competition in the market. In both scenarios, one
should evaluate the e¤ect of price collusion on the decision of not only how
many product variants, but also which product variants should be kept after
collusion. We analyze in this paper the e¤ect of pruning decisions on the
product lines of a collusive entity when quality is a key competitive factor
of the market.
Examples of pruning and proliferation can be found almost everywhere.
While at rst sight, these phenomena seem to be randomly widespread,
proliferation prevail in horizontally di¤erentiated markets, such as auto-
mobile industry, insurance markets, and the food industry, while pruning
is frequently observed in industries where products are mainly di¤erenti-
ated along a quality dimension (Siebert, 2015). The high-tech industries
provides nice examples of pruning: Apple withdraws from the mobile indus-
try the iPhone 5 when marketing the higher quality iPhone 6, smart TVs
launched by Samsung and LG make traditional apparels obsolete and likely
to be pulled out of the market soon. Second, in the sectors where pruning
prevails, ghting brands are sometimes marketed: beyond a high quality
variant, a rm sells also a lower quality good designed to ght low-price
competitors and possibly make them inactive. This strategy was adopted by
IBM against its competitor Hewlett-Packard. For a long time, in the printer
market IBM conned its production to a high quality product, the so called
LaserPrinter. However, as a reaction to low-end competition coming from
Hewlett-Packard, IBM introduced a defensive brand, the LaserPrinter E.
This product was identical to the originally marketed LaserPrinter except
for the fact that its software limited its printing to ve rather than ten pages
per minute.1
In this paper, we examine whether pruning emerges in post-merger com-
petition when rms compete along a quality dimension and, if so, whether
a kind of ghting brand is kept by the cartel in its portfolio.
The dilemma between pruning and proliferating products has been ini-
tially faced by the literature on monopoly price discrimination. In the pi-
oneering contribution by Mussa and Rosen (1978), a price-discriminating
1See Ritson (2009),"Should You Launch a Fighter Brand" for a more detailed account
of these case studies.
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monopolist denes its optimal product line when products are of di¤erent
qualities. It shows that the optimal solution di¤ers crucially according to
how the cost increases with respect to quality. Intuitively, if this increase
is slow, the monopolist chooses to sell only the top quality to half of the
whole population of consumers. On the contrary, if costs with respect to
quality increase faster, the quality level o¤ered to lower-value consumers is
distorted downward: such a distortion is optimal since it prevents higher-
value customers to buy the low quality good instead of the good targeted to
them.
Of course, the trade-o¤ between proliferation and pruning is made more
intricate in the case of competition. When rms face rivals, the benet of dis-
criminating among consumers through proliferation has to be put in balance
with the gain of moving product qualities apart from each other, thereby
softening price competition, along with the benet from escaping intra-rm
cannibalization. When embracing this perspective, the most part of the the-
oretical analysis on proliferation versus pruning tends to solve this tension
in terms of entry-deterring device (Schmalensee 1978, Bonanno 1987, Tirole,
1988): an incumbent rm decides to adjust its products line as a reaction
to (potential) entrant(s), expanding its own product variety or rather with-
drawing some goods depending on its cost function, marginal revenue and
market size, inter alia.2 More recent investigations have shown that prolifer-
ation strategies enable rms to match products to heterogeneous consumers
(Kekre and Srinivasan 1990, Bayus and Putsis 1999, Siebert 2015).3
Our paper extends the above literature examining whether the formation
of cartels into a market populated by an arbitrary number of rms has an
impact on the range of products sold by these rms. Does cartel price opti-
mization implies that some variants are pruned from the product portfolio
of the cartel? And, if this is true, which among the variants remain for sale?
To this end, we rst determine the conditions characterizing the pre-merger
noncooperative price equilibrium when all rms act independently and can
each produce a single variant. Then, we assume that some k; with k  n;
among these rms collude and, as a consequence, control both the range
2 In Johnson and Myatt (2003), these drivers are considered when duopolists selling
multiple quality-di¤erentiated products and facing a potential entrant compete in quantity.
The authors nd that an incumbent never responds to the entrant by expanding its product
line when marginal revenue is everywhere decreasing. Rather, under entry, the incumbent
prunes lower-quality products from the basket of its sales, thereby choosing to "focus on
quality."
3Empirical analysis also contribute to this issue. See Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1993), Berry and Waldvogel (1999), Davis (2002) and Petrin (2002), among many others.
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of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct
rm.4 In the case when k = n; a full price collusion occurs and the market
is monopolized by an a priori multi-product monopolist. When k < n, the
colluding rms can compete against single-product rms or against other
groups of colluding rms. The former scenario resembles a multiproduct
rm against a fringe of single-product competitors, while the latter mimics
price competition among multiproduct rms. We describe the pricing be-
havior of rms in either scenario and examine how the quality gap(s) among
products are consequently a¤ected.
We nd that it is always more protable for the cartel under either full or
partial collusion to adopt a pricing strategy such that some existing variants
are withdrawn from the market. On the one hand, a reduction of product va-
riety reduces the number of goods competing in the market with an upward
movement of prices and a possible gain in prots. On the other hand, reduc-
ing the range of products in the market prevents rms from discriminating
among consumers, thus entailing a loss in prots. The former gain from
pruning is larger than the corresponding losses from missing the demand of
some consumers. Thus, pruning always prevails, regardless of the number
of rms deciding to collude and the quality of the variants that these rms
initially produce in the market.5
Moreover, we show that, under pruning, the colluding rms keep on sale
in their portfolio a kind of ghting brand when facing competitors in the
lower quality segment of the market. Indeed, when k = n (full collusion),
only the top variant is kept for sale. When k < n; the variants for sale
chosen by the colluding rms only consist at most of the top quality variant
and the bottom quality one, among those initially existing in the bundle
of variants owned by them. The bottom quality can thus be viewed as a
ghting brand for the cartel. Further, under partial collusion, the prices
are for all rms always higher than at the noncooperative Nash equilibrium
without collusion, but lower than under full collusion.
4The dilemma between pruning and proliferation under mergers has received scarce
attention. Some noticeable exceptions are the analysis by Lommerud and Sorgard (1997),
Gandhi et al. (2008) and Chen and Schwartz (2013).
5Our analysis is somehow related to the one developed by Martinez-Giralt and Neven
(1988), later discussed by Tabuchi (2012). In a horizontal di¤erentiated market, Martinez-
Giralt and Neven (1988) nd, for both circle and line models, that duopolists with two
stores each at equilibrium bunch their two stores at the same point. In our perspective,
their result implies that the incentive to relax price competition dominates the incentive
to segment the market. See on this also Chamorro-Rivas (2000), Giraud-Héraud et al.
(2003), Bae and Choi (2007).
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2 Pruning in a vertically di¤erentiated market
2.1 The model
Let a set N of rms, i = 1; 2; :::; n; o¤er product variants v1; v2; :::; vn, re-
spectively, with vi 2 (0;1) and vn > vn 1 > ::: > v1 to a population of
consumers in a vertically di¤erentiated market.6 Consumers are assumed
uniformly distributed in the interval [0; ], with  < 1 and indexed by
scalar . The parameter  captures consumerswillingness to pay for qual-
ity. Our instantaneous demand set-up is directly inspired by the traditional
model of vertical product di¤erentiation (see Mussa and Rosen 1978; Gab-
szewicz and Thisse 1979). Accordingly, the utility consumer  derives from
buying at price pi variant i; is given by
U() =

vi   pi if she/he buys variant i
0 if she/he refrains from buying.
(1)
With reservation prices dened for consumers included in the interval [0; ],
the market is endogenously uncovered.
Finally, since we assume that the qualities are exogenously given, we
disregard costs. In general, our implicit assumption is that, for all rms i =
1; 2; :::; n, the quality levels v1; v2; :::; vn are such that all rmsequilibrium
prots are non negative.
2.2 Ex-ante price equilibrium
We rst consider the case in which all rms behave noncooperatively. The
equilibrium behaviour of rms can be characterized by looking at the behav-
iour of three types of rms competing in the quality spectrum: top, inter-
mediate and bottom quality rm. The top quality rm. i.e. the one selling
the top quality variant and indexed with i = n, maximizes its prot
n =

   pn   pn 1
vn   vn 1

pn; (2)
therefore setting the price according to its best-reply function
pn(pn 1) =
1
2
(pn 1 + (vn   vn 1)) : (3)
6 In our model all rm variants v1; v2; :::; vn are given exogenously and the rms can
only a¤ect the variants remaining on sale by setting their prices. For a (three-rm) model
looking at the rm strategic choice of qualities and prices, see Gabszewicz, Marini and
Tarola (2015) and Marini (2016).
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An intermediate quality rm, i.e. a rm selling an intermediate variant
i = 2; 3; :::; (n  1), maximizes its payo¤
i =

pi+1   pi
vi+1   vi  
pi   pi 1
vi   vi 1

pi (4)
and imposes a price respecting its best-reply function, namely
pi(pi 1; p+1) =
1
2
pi 1(vi+1   vi) + pi+1(vi   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi 1) : (5)
Finally, the bottom quality rm selling the bottom quality variant (i = 1)
maximizes the prot function
1 =

p2   p1
v2   v1  
p1
v1

p1; (6)
sets its price according to its best reply function, namely
p1(p2) =
1
2
p2v1
v2
: (7)
Notice, from (2)-(6), that all rms prot functions are concave in their
own prices. Moreover, for all rms, prices and qualities are strategic com-
plements ( @
2
i i
@pi@vi
> 0), so that rm best-reply shifts outward as a result of
an increase in its quality. On the other hand, for every rm i, the e¤ect of
an increase in the quality of its direct rivalsvariants vj , for j = (i+ 1) and
(i  1) is negative ( @2i i@pi@vj < 0) and, therefore, price-competition becomes
tougher as a result. Notice also that, since best-replies are contractions,7
the existence of a unique (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium price vector p
is guaranteed in the model for any (nite) number of rms competing in the
market.8
7A su¢ cient condition for the contraction property to hold is (see, for instance, Vives
2000, p.47):
@2i
@ (pi)
2 +
P
j 6=i
 @2i@pi@pj
 < 0;
which, using (4) for all intermediate rms i = 2; :::; n  1, becomes
  2 (vi+1   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi) (vi   vi 1) +
vi+1   vi 1
(vi+1   vi) (vi   vi 1) =
vi 1   vi+1
(vi+1   vi) (vi   vi 1) < 0 (8)
which is satised for vn > vn 1 > ::: > v1. The same applies for top and bottom quality
rms.
8See, for instance Friedman (1991), p.84.
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2.3 Collusive agreements
A collusive agreement is viewed as a an agreement passed among a subset
of individual rms to choose the variants kept for sale and the price charged
for each of these variants.
2.3.1 Full collusion
We denote by full collusion the case when all n rms collude in prices. In
this scenario, the cartel maximizes the sum of all rmspayo¤s:
N =
X
i2N
i = 1 + :::+ i 1 + i + i+1 + :::+ n:
For every colluding rm i, i = 1; :::; n, the rst-order condition writes as9
@N
@pi
=
@i 1
@pi
+
@i
@pi
+
@i+1
@pi
= 0: (9)
Since the top quality-rm i = n in the cartel internalizes only the payo¤ of
its lower-quality neighbour, its optimal reply writes as
pcn(pn 1) = pn 1 +

2
(vn   vn 1) : (10)
Along the same rationale, for all intermediate rms i = 2; 3; :::; (n 1) which
are members of the cartel, the optimal reply writes as
pci (pi 1; pi+1) =
pi 1(vi+1   vi) + pi+1(vi   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi 1) ; (11)
since they internalize the payo¤ of their adjacent neighbour members of the
cartel. Finally, the optimal reply of the bottom quality rm i = 1 is given
by
pc1(p2) =
v1
v2
p2: (12)
In the next proposition, we characterize the equilibrium prices set by
the rms under full price collusion and the number of variants remaining on
sale.
9Note that @
2N
@p2i
=   2(vi+1 vi 1)
(vi+1 vi)(vi vi 1)
< 0 for i = 2; 3; :::; n   1, and, therefore, the
joint prot N is concave in every rms price pi. The same condition holds for the two
extreme rms along the quality spectrum, i.e. i = 1 and i = n.
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Proposition 1 Under full price collusion: (i) every rm i = 1; 2; :::; n sets
a price pci ; with
pci =
1
2

iP
j=1
(vj   vj 1) > pi ,
where pi stands for rm is ex-ante noncooperative price; (ii) the demand
Di (p
c
i ) of the bottom (i = 1) and of all intermediate quality rms i =
2; :::; n   1 is nil, while for the top-quality rm i = n, Dn(pcn) is positive
and corresponds to the demand of the upper part

1
2 ; 

of the consumers
population.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result does not come as a surprise, and simply duplicates the
well known result occurring under monopoly and quasi-linear preferences
of consumers (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978).10 Conversely, what appears
as relatively unexplored is the case of partial price collusion in a vertical
di¤erentiated market, which we consider in detail below.
2.3.2 Partial price collusion
A vertically di¤erentiated market is a market of local interaction, with every
rm i = 1; 2; :::; n; having its demand depending on at most three prices: its
own price and the two prices of its neighbours. There are two exceptions
to this statement: rst, the case of the top quality rm, since the demand
faced by this rm depends only on its own price and the price of its sole
adjacent rm; second, the case of the bottom quality rm, whose demand
is depending on its own price and the price of its sole adjacent rm. In
all other cases, whatever its quality, a rm interacts with its two adjacent
rivals, a lower-quality competitor and a higher quality one.
Thus, when using the rst-order conditions for characterizing an equi-
librium with a cartel S  N , we need to consider separately the case of (i)
any rm member of the cartel whose cartel neighbours are selling lower as
well as higher quality variants than its own (call them interior cartel mem-
bers and the corresponding cartel an interior cartel), (ii) the rm member
10 In Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse (1986) it is proved that if the unit cost is
(zero or) constant, or rises only slowly with quality, the result of Proposition 1 holds for
any multi-product monopoly. Extending the model to a duopoly, Champsaur and Rochet
(1989, 1990) and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006) show that each rm produces a
single quality rather than a range of qualities under a similar set-up to the one used here:
quasilinear utility, uniform distribution of consumer taste, and quadratic cost of quality
improvement.
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of the cartel whose neighbours variant is selling lower quality than its own
(call him the low boundary cartel member), and (iii) the rm member of
the cartel whose neighbours variant is selling a higher quality than its own
(call him the upper boundary cartel member). To each of these members,
the rst order condition of prot maximization writes as:
(i) in the case of interior cartel members:
@S
@pi
=
@
X
i2S i
@pi
=
@i 1
@pi
+
@i
@pi
+
@i+1
@pi
= 0;
leading to the optimal reply function
ppci (pi 1; pi+1) =
pi 1(vi+1   vi) + pi+1(vi   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi 1) , (13)
where the superscript pc stands for partial collusion.
(ii) In the case of lower boundary cartel member:
@S
@pi
=
@
X
i2S i
@pi
=
@i
@pi
+
@i+1
@pi
= 0;
leading to the best-reply function
ppci (pi 1; pi+1) =
1
2pi 1(vi+1   vi) + pi+1(vi   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi 1) : (14)
(iii) Finally, in the case of upper boundary cartel member:
@S
@pi
=
@
X
i2S i
@pi
=
@i
@pi
+
@i 1
@pi
= 0;
leading to the best-reply function
ppci (pi 1; pi+1) =
pi 1(vi+1   vi) + 12pi+1(vi   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi 1) : (15)
Notice that, for the rms i = 1 or i = n; the prices pi 1 and pi+1 in the
above expressions have no meaning so that their best reply functions are,
for i = 1;
ppc1 (p2) =
v1
v2
p2
and, for i = n;
ppcn (pn 1) = pn 1 +

2
(vn   vn 1) :
We can now prove that
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Proposition 2 Under partial price collusion leading to an interior cartel,
only two variants remain on sale, the top and the bottom quality good pro-
duced into the cartel portfolio. On the other hand, if the cartel includes the
top quality variant i = n, only two variants remain on sale, the highest and
lowest quality variants in the cartel portfolio. Finally, if the cartel includes
the bottom quality i = 1; only one variant remains for sale, namely the top
quality variant in the cartel portfolio.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above statements provide a characterization of equilibrium market
congurations. Proposition 2 shows that it is optimal for any cartel to drop
from the market as many variants as possible, except the top and the bottom
quality ones among those previously on sale. Furthermore, when the cartel
includes the rm selling the bottom quality among all existing variants, the
cartel does not need to keep on sale the lowest variant.
Example 1 Let an arbitrary number of rms compete in the markets,
e. g. N = 14, therefore initially branding fourteen di¤erent variants,
v1; v2; :::; v14. (i) Suppose now that an interior cartel SI = f5; 6; 7; 8g forms.
In this case, only variants v5 and v8 remain on sale by the cartel and, over-
all, only 14  4 + 2 = 12 variants remain on sale in the market (see Figure
1). (ii) Alternatively, let the top cartel ST = f10; 11; 12; 13; 14g form. In
this case, only variants v10 and v14 are on sale from the cartel and, overall,
only 14   5 + 2 = 11 variants are left for sale (Figure 2). Finally, when
the bottom cartel SB = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g is formed only its highest variant v6
remain on sale and a total of 14  6 + 1 = 9 variants remain on sale in the
market (Figure 3).
Figure 1
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Figure 2
Figure 3
It is worth remarking that, although pruning always prevails, whatever
the type of colluding entity occurring in the market (top/interior/bottom
cartel), the set of variants on sale at equilibrium changes with the type of
collusive agreement. In particular, we observe that a low quality variant is
sold by a top cartel and an intermediate cartel, but never by a bottom cartel.
In brief, the rationale underlying this nding can be described as follows.
By (2)-(6) we know that, for every i-th rm, @
2
i i
@pi@vj
< 0, and, therefore,
an increase in adjacent rivals quality vj (with j = i   1 and j = i + 1)
has a detrimental e¤ect on its prot. Accordingly, cartel members possess a
direct incentive to reduce the quality of their neighbours in order to increase
the quality gap between the existing variants and, thus, their prot. Since
the highest incentive among the colluding rms is for the top quality rm
in the cartel, the members of the cartel keep only their top quality on sale
and start pruning all existing variants in the cartel until their lowest quality
one. However, when in presence of lower quality competitor(s), if the cartel
decides to shut down also its bottom quality rm, it would directly compete
with a rm external to the cartel whose pricing behaviour would denitely
be more aggressive than that of its lowest quality member. So, it is optimal
in this case to keep a defensive or ghting brand.11
11 It would be interesting to consider these incentives in a horizontally di¤erentiated
11
Casual observations show that a ghting brand usually appear when a
rm competes against lower quality rival(s) in the market.12 Through the
lens of our result, the practice of unbrand management can, thus, be seen
as a means to avoid intra-rm cannibalization and to widen as much as
possible the existing quality gap between variants. As far as the bottom
cartel, a ghting brand would not play any role since this cartel does not
face a low-end competitor. Further, the unbrand management would not
prevent the lowest quality variant produced by this cartel from cannibalizing
the market share of the adjacent variant, namely the top one in this bottom
cartel. Accordingly, the bottom cartel restricts its sales to the highest quality
variant it can produce.
Moreover, the next result directly follows from Proposition 3. It allows
to easily compute the number of variants on sale in any possible partial
cartelization.
Proposition 3 In a generic partition of the n rms P = (S1; S2; :::; Sm)
organized in m < n cartels, a total of 2m+(n  z)  1 (resp. 2m+(n  z))
variants are put on sale in the market when the partition includes (resp.
does not include) the bottom cartel, for z = s1 + s2 + :::+ sm, where sj, for
j = 1; 2; :::;m, denotes the cardinality of every cartel.
The next example clarify how Proposition 3 works.
Example 2 Suppose again that N = 14 and some subsets of rms
form two cartels, a bottom cartel SB = (1; 2; 3; 4) and a top cartel ST =
(9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14). In this case rms give rise to partition
C = (f1; 2; 3; 4g ; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; f10; 11; 12; 13; 14g)
and, according to Proposition 3 and 4, the number of variants remaining
on sale are 2m + (n  z)   1 = 2(2) + (14  10)   1 = 7, i.e. one variant
from the bottom cartel, two variants from the top cartel and four from the
remaining rms in the fringe (see Figure 4).
market. In a Hotelling model, Hinloopen and Martin (2016) provide the general condi-
tions on the cost-of-location function such that a price-location Nash equilibrium in pure
strategy exists. Their analysis could be a useful entry point for examining the incentive
of colluding rms to prune or proliferate their product portfolio when located along a
line. For a general discussion on horizontal di¤erentiated markets and a comparison with
vertical di¤erentiated markets, see also Gabszewicz and Tarola (2016).
12This is in line with the evidence gathered in the introduction.
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Figure 4
Finally, we conclude the characterization of partial collusion by introduc-
ing a price comparison with both the noncooperative and the fully collusive
case.
Proposition 4 Under partial price collusion all rms i = 1; 2; :::; n set
prices ppci higher than the corresponding prices set at the noncooperative equi-
librium pi and lower than the ones occurring under full price collusion p
c
i .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that the above result holds for any arbitrary quality gap existing
among rmsvariants and its proof does not require to derive the equilib-
rium prices in closed form (see the Appendix). The latter task can be quite
awkward without assuming some regularity conditions on quality gaps. By
following the approach taken by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) of equidistant
quality gaps, the next proposition characterizes the equilibrium prices for
the noncooperative case.13 A full taxonomy of partial collusive prices under
this assumption is not presented here and it is left to interested readers.
Proposition 5 Let market variants v1; v2; :::; vn be equispaced and such that
vi   vi 1 =  for every i = 1; 2; :::; n, with v0 = 0. Thus, the noncooperative
(Nash) equilibrium price vector of all rms i = 1; 2; :::; n is given by:
pi =
(
 
2 +
p
3
i    2 p3i)p
3
 
2 +
p
3
n
+
p
3
 
2 p3n ;
Proof. See the Appendix.
13 In Gabszewicz et al. (2016) it is shown that the equidistance bewteen variants is
a su¢ cient condition for the whole market cartel to be coalitionally stable (core-stable)
against any possible deviation of partial cartels.
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3 Concluding Remarks
In this analysis, we have considered the dilemma between pruning and pro-
liferation in a vertically di¤erentiated market with more than two rms. We
have shown that, the cannibalization e¤ect inducing pruning is so signicant
that proliferation never occurs.
Our paper provides a further dimension of analysis on the e¤ects de-
termined by collusive agreements. The standard understanding of collusion
is that rms producing homogeneous goods collude in order to mimic the
behaviour of a monopoly. Based on this, cartels are typically viewed as a
means to reduce competition. In the current paper, it is not clear a pri-
ori whether a cartel is detrimental to the market, since it yields a quality
shift, in addition to the outcomes typically described in the literature on
collusion. Similar considerations can be applied to the analysis of hori-
zontal mergers. The traditional approach to mergers is mainly linked to
industry-concentration measures whose value can determine presumptions
of illegality. In our work, the e¤ects of a merger are not only depending
on the number of merging rms but also (and primarily) on the qualities
initially produced by the rms.
While disentagling these issues goes beyond the aim of this paper, it
opens the door to further research in the eld of competition policy.
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4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) After some manipulations the price of every
rm i = 1; 2; :::; n under full collusion can be easily obtained in closed form
as
pci =
1
2

P
ji
j ; (16)
where i = (vi   vi 1) denotes the quality gap between every rm i =
1; 2; :::; n and its lower quality-neighbour (i  1), whereas 1 = (v1   v0) =
v1. The fact that pci > p

i for every i = 1; 2; :::; n, can be proved through
the following steps: (a) Start with the prole of Nash equilibrium prices,
p = (p1; p2; :::; pn) and assume, with no loss of generality, that rms i =
2; 3; :::; n respond, instead of noncooperatively, by setting prices according
to their fully collusive optimal replies (10)-(11). Comparing (3)-(7) with
(10)-(12) we see that all rmsreplies are positively sloped and additionally
that the collusive optimal replies are twice as steep as the noncooperative
best-replies. Thus, it follows that after step (a), all rms i = 2; 3; :::; n in-
crease their prices. (b) Let now also rm 1 respond cooperatively, hence
increasing its price as well. (c) Let such adjustment process continue for all
rms and, given that all rmsoptimal replies are contractions, a new (fully
collusive) price prole pc = (pc1; p
c
2; :::; p
c
n) will be nally reached, with the
property that, for every i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n, pi < p
c
i . (ii) Using (6) and (16) the
demand of the bottom-quality rm i = 1 under full collusion is
D1(p
c
1; p
c
2) =

pc2   pc1
v2   v1  
pc1
v1

=
 
1
2 (1 + 2)  121
2
 
1
21
1
!
= 0
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and, analogously, that of every intermediate rm i = 2; 3; :::; n  1 writes as
Di(p
c
i 1; p
c
i ; p
c
i+1) =

pci+1   pci
i+1
  p
c
i   pci 1
i 1

=
=

1
2

P
ji+1 j  12
P
ji j
i+1
 
1
2

P
ji j  12
P
ji 1 j
i 1

=
=
 1
2
i+1
i+1
 
1
2
i
i

= 0:
Finally, for the top quality rm i = n, the demand under full collusion is:
Di(p
c
n 1; p
c
n) =

   p
c
n   pcn 1
vn   vn 1

=
=

  
1
2

P
jn j  12
P
jn 1 j
n

=

  
1
2
n
n

=
1
2
:
Therefore, when the whole industry cartel forms and signs a binding agree-
ment on prices, it behaves as a single monopolist by o¤ering uniquely its
top variant at a marketable price and covering only one-half of the whole
population of consumers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Take a generic intermediate cartel of k  n 2
rms initially selling variants
vi; vi+1; vi+2; :::; vi+k
and competing, both with a left-hand fringe of independent rms selling
lower quality variants v1; v2; :::; vi 1 and with a righ-hand fringe selling, al-
ternatively, higher quality variants vi+k+1; vi+k+2; :::; vn. Using expressions
(13)-(15) the optimal-replies of the rms in the cartel are
ppci (pi 1; pi+1) =
1
2pi 1(vi+1   vi) + pi+1(vi   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi 1)
ppci+1(pi; pi+2) =
pi(vi+2   vi+1) + pi+2(vi+1   vi)
(vi+2   vi)
ppci+2(pi+1; pi+3) =
pi(vi+3   vi+2) + pi+3(vi+2   vi+1)
(vi+3   vi+1)
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ppci+k(pi+k 1; pi+k+1) =
pi+k 1(vi+k+1   vi+k) + 12pi+k+1 (vi+k   vi+k 1)
vi+k+1   vi+k 1 :
where only the two extreme rms i and i + k in the cartel are directly
competing with the rms outside. Without loss of generality, take a generic
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rm inside the cartel producing an intermediate variant (i.e neither the
bottom nor the top quality within the cartel), say rm i+1. Using both the
optimal reply of rm i+ 1 and those of the rms connected to it (i.e. rms
i and i + 2) and re-arranging, we obtain the optimal replies of these three
rms as functions of pi 1 and pi+3 only.
~pi = p
pc
i (pi 1; pi+3) =
1
2
pi 1 (vi+3   vi) + 2pi+3(vi   vi 1)
vi+3   vi 1 ;
~pi+1 = p
pc
i+1(pi 1; pi+3) =
1
2
pi 1(vi+3   vi+1) + 2pi+3(vi+1   vi 1)
vi+3   vi 1 ;
~pi+2 = p
pc
i+2(pi 1; pi+3) =
1
2
pi 1(vi+3   vi+2) + 2pi+3(vi+2   vi 1)
vi+3   vi 1 :
Using the above, we can easily compute the optimal market share of rm
(i+ 1) as
Di+1(~pi; ~pi+1; ~pi+2) =
~pi+2   ~pi+1
vi+2   vi+1  
~pi+1   ~pi
vi+1   vi = 0
which proves that under partial collusion every intermediate rm of an in-
termediate cartel obtains zero market share. Repeating now the same pro-
cedure for the rm producing the lowest quality in the cartel (here rm i),
we obtain instead that
Di(~pi; ~pi+1; ~pi 1) =
~pi+1   ~pi
vi+1   vi  
~pi   ~pi 1
vi   vi 1 =
1
2
~pi 1
(vi   vi 1) > 0
for ~pi 1 > 0. Finally, computing the optimal replies of the highest quality
rm in the cartel, i.e. rm (i+ k), and of the rms directly connected to it,
we obtain
~pi+k 1(pi+k 2; pi+k) =
pi+k 2(vi+k 1   vi+k 2) + pi+k (vi+k 1   vi+k 2)
vi+k   vi+k 2
~pi+k(pi+k 1; pi+k+1) =
pi+k 1(vi+k+1   vi+k) + 12pi+k+1 (vi+k   vi+k 1)
vi+k+1   vi+k 1
~pi+k+1(pi+k; pi+k+2) =
1
2
pi+k(vi+k+2   vi+k+1) + pi+k+2 (vi+k+1   vi+k)
vi+k+2   vi+k :
Using the above,
Di+k(~pi+k 1; ~pi+k; ~pi+k+1) =
~pi+k+1   ~pi+k
vi+k+1   vi+k  
~pi+k   ~pi+k 1
vi+k   vi+k 1 =
=
1
2
~pi+k+1
(vi+k   vi+k 1) > 0.
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showing that only the variants produced by the two rms at the extremes of
this (generic) intermediate cartel are sold at prices implying positive market
shares. Exactly the same procedure proves that, in a top cartel, only the
highest and the lowest quality variants initially sold by the cartel remain on
sale.
Finally, let us consider a bottom cartel, i.e. a cartel formed by rms
1; 2; :::; k initially selling k variants v1; v2; ::::vk and competing with (n  k)
independent rms selling the higher quality variants vk+1; vk+2; :::; vn. Again,
we can apply the same argument used above to show that every rm in the
interior of the cartel (i.e neither selling the lowest quality nor the highest
quality variant in the cartel) obtains zero market share. Also, for the top
quality rm in the cartel (here rm k), we obtain that Dk(~pk; ~pk 1; ~pk+1) >
0: Finally, when considering a rm selling the lowest quality variant in any
bottom cartel, its market share simply writes as:
D1(p2; p1) =
p2   p1
v2   v1  
p1
v1
;
that, using rms 1 optimal collusive reply ppc1 (p2) =
v1
v2
p2, becomes
D1(p2; ~p1) =
p2   v1v2 p2
v2   v1  
v1
v2
p2
v1
= 0;
showing that, di¤erently from other cartels, a bottom cartel optimally pro-
duces only its top-quality variant vk. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us assume here, for simplicity, that only
one cartel S  N has formed, and that the remaining rms play as sin-
gletons. However, the same reasoning would apply to the case with more
than one cartel. It can be easily checked that the joint prot of an arbitrary
cartel S =
P
i2S i is concave with respect to the price pi of every rm
i 2 S. Moreover, optimal reply functions of partially collusive rms i 2 S
are contractions (cf. footnote 5) and, hence, a unique partially collusive
price prole ppc exists for any given prole of qualities v1; v2; :::vn. Further-
more, as for the proof of proposition 1, we can: (a) start with a prole pof
Nash equilibrium prices. (b) Let rms in S  N reply using their partially
collusive optimal replies. A quick comparison of the optimal replies under
partial collusion (13)-(15) and those of their noncooperative counterparts
(3)-(7) shows that the former are more reactive to prices than the latter and
positively sloped, so that the rms in the cartel will set now higher prices
than in the noncooperative scenario. (c) The same occur to all rms in the
fringe playing noncooperatively: given the higher prices of the cartel, they
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will now respond in accordance to their best-replies by increasing their prices
as well.(d) The described adjustment process, given the contraction prop-
erty of rmsoptimal reply functions, converges to a new prole of prices
ppcsuch that ppci > p

i for every i = 1; 2; :::; n. The inequality p
c
i > p
pc
i for all
i = 1; 2; :::; n can be proved along similar lines. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. From the n rst order conditions of nonco-
operative rms the following system of second order di¤erence equations is
obtained:
1p2   2(1 + 2)p1 = 0
ipi+1   2(i + i+1)pi + i+1pi 1 = 0, for i = 2; :::; n  1
2pn   pn 1   n = 0;
where i = vi   vi 1 for i = 1; 2; :::; n indicates the existing quality gap
between rm variants, and v0 = 0. Under equispaced variants i =  for
every i = 1; 2; :::; n the system of equations becomes
p2   4p1 = 0
pi+1   4pi + pi 1 = 0 for i = 2; :::; n  1
2pn   pn 1 = :
Using a standard technique, the equation of every rms i = 1; 2; :::; n   1
can be written as
Abi+1   4Abi +Abi 1 = 0:
whose characteristic equation possesses the following two distinct real roots
b1 = 2 +
p
3, b2 = 2 
p
3:
Therefore, for every i = 1; 2; :::n we can write
pi = A1b
i
1 +A2b
i
2: (17)
Now, using the fact that for the bottom quality rm,
p2   4p1 = 0
we can set
p0 = A1b
0
1 +A2b
0
2 = A1 +A2 = 0
implying
A2 =  A1: (18)
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Moroever, since for the top quality rm
2pn   pn 1 = 
from which
pn 1 = A1bn 11 +A2b
n 1
2 = A1
 
bn 11   bn 12

= 2A1 (b
n
1   bn2 )  ;
we obtain
A1
 
bn 11   bn 12
  2A1 (bn1   bn2 ) +  = 0
and, then,
A1 =
 
2bn1   2bn2   bn 11 + bn 12
 :
As a nal step, by inserting coe¢ cients A1 and A2 in (17), we obtain
pi = A1 (b1)
i +A2 (b2)
i = A1 (b1)
i  A1 (b2)i =

 
bi1   bi2

p
3bn1 +
p
3bn2
;
for every i = 1; 2; :::; n, with b1 =
 
2 +
p
3

and b2 =
 
2 p3, which
concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
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